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GENERAL BACKGROUND
This paper describes the machinery that has nowbeen put in place in England and Wales to hearappeals from those individuals who have been
prohibited from working with children under the
Protection of Children Act 1999, the Care Standards Act
2000, and the Education (Restriction of Employment)
Regulations 2000 (SI No 2419). Initial decisions are taken
as regards teachers by the Secretary of State for Education
and Skills, and as regards social workers, by the Secretary
of State for Health. Until recently such decisions where
only susceptible to judicial review in the sense that the
procedures could be investigated by the High Court. The
merits of the decision however were not capable of any
judicial investigation, except perhaps in the more
exceptional case where it could be argued that the relevant
Government department had reached a decision that no
reasonable person would have reached.
Such an approach was understandable. Child protection
policies inevitably were at the forefront of a strategy
designed to ensure that our children are safeguarded from
contact with people who are considered unsuitable because
the person presents a risk to their safety or welfare. Our
criminal law, our public family law and our administrative
law must respond to the necessity of placing a child’s safety
and welfare as the paramount consideration. Teachers and
social workers and others who work with children must
face the prospect that they will be barred from working in
their chosen profession, as a result of behaviour by them in
relation to children in their care that places these children
at risk.
It should be pointed out that this paper is not concerned
with the criminal law, where a court can disqualify a person
from working with children and young persons as part of
the sentence after a criminal conviction (see Criminal
Justice and Court Services Act 2000 ss 26-42). The Care
Standards Tribunal will receive review applications from
people in this position, but only 10 years after sentence (or
five years in the case of a person under 18 at the time of
sentence).
Inevitably, however, there are major and sometimes
conflicting policy issues. For example, should safeguarding
children extend to protecting them from the behaviour in
private of an adult whose example may be “unacceptable”
(see for example para 25 of the guidance document
produced by the Department for Education and Skills
entitled Preventing unsuitable people from working with children
and young persons). And what amounts to “unacceptable”? It
is not possible to provide a comprehensive definition, and
the Guidance for Education Staff goes no further than
referring to “behaviour, which involves a breach of a
teacher’s position of trust, or a breach of the standards of
propriety, expected of the profession (para 19(c)).”
England and Wales has struggled with these dilemmas
throughout most of the last 50 years. It has to be said that
the difficulties may well have been increased by the need to
ensure a balanced service for vulnerable children that
encourages “efforts to work alongside families rather than
disempower them.” Thus the focus has been on the overall
needs of children rather than the narrow concentration on
an alleged incident (“Child protection – messages from
research, 1995, London, HMSO). Inevitably, the requirement
to support families in a non-threatening way has resulted
occasionally in individual failures and sadly sometimes also
in institutional failures to protect children. A failure by a
professional requires the availability of emergency powers
to remove the professional from his or her position of trust.
But we are talking here of draconian powers. The
implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, bringing
European Convention standards into direct application in
the domestic law, has highlighted the tension that has
always existed between children’s welfare on the one hand
and the right to work as a professional or a volunteer in a
chosen child centred profession. An example of this is the
decision of the Registered Homes Tribunal (no 420,
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where an individual who ran a residential care home was
acquitted of sexual abuse allegations yet had his registration
of the home cancelled. His appeal to the RHT was dismissed.
Principles of proportionality, so important in any
consideration of the European Convention on Human
Rights, must now play the critical role in these difficult and
sensitive decisions, for there are two conflicting arguments,
both clearly understandable, that can be persuasive.
First, it could be argued that the creation of a system
that bars a person from working with children in certain
situations is necessary so as to install confidence in the
provision both of public child care and the educational
services. The ultimate justification is the protection of
children from the risk of harm; thus balance and
proportionality in an individual case are not the only
factors. There may be a trump card.
Secondly and in contrast, some may argue that in the
context of these essentially individual decisions taken by
the Government departments is the sometimes overriding
need of Government to ensure that the crisis in teacher
and social work numbers is not unduly accentuated.
Another not wholly unconnected policy concern relates to
the growing number of residential homes that become
uneconomic and therefore must otherwise close because
they cannot meet the exacting demands imposed upon
them by the newly created National Care Standards
Commission policy. (The Times reported on 2 July 2002 the
sad story of a lady aged 108 who was moved to a new care
home when her old one had to close because it was unable
to meet the more exacting standards of the Care Homes
Act 2000. This was obviously a traumatic move for a lady
of this advanced age and she died within a month,
apparently after refusing food in her new home). These are
matters that cannot be wholly ignored by decision makers,
either at first instance or on appeal.
In weighing these policy issues, it is argued here that
proportionality and balance must be a key link to ensure
that the correct approach is taken and thus that possibly
conflicting policy considerations are placed in the
appropriate balance.
Indeed, case law prior to the introduction of statutory
safeguards, when only a non-statutory framework was in
place, gave balance a central position. Thus in R v Secretary
of State for Health exparte C [2000] EWCA 49, Hale LJ said:
“Underlying this issue is the balance to be struck between two
important interests. One is the interest of any individual in
safeguarding his reputation and livelihood against the serious
interference which inclusion on anything like an official
‘blacklist’ may entail. The other is the interest of children
living away from home, and the interest of the community
which seeks to safeguard its vulnerable members, in effective
protection from abuse and neglect and other risks to which
they are subject…”
This particular case did not conclude at that stage. The
case before the Court of Appeal concerned a review of the
decision to place C on the then non-statutory
“consultancy” index maintained by the Department. His
name was transferred on to the statutory list when the
Protection of Children Act 1999 came into force. An
appeal was heard by the Tribunal and his appeal was
allowed [0037]. The Department appealed on a point of
law to the High Court, and the appeal was heard by Scott
Baker J in early June 2002. The appeal was dismissed (C v
Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWCH 1381 (Admin). A
subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal overruled Scott
Baker J and remitted the case to the Tribunal for rehearing:
[2003] EWCA Civ 10.
Newman J, in R v Worcester County Council, Secretary of State
for the Department of Health exparte “S.W.” [2000] EWHC
Admin 392 said much the same as Hale LJ in R v Secretary
of State for Health exparte C. The judge said:
“Assuming as I do that the consequences of being included on
the index is to interfere with employment, I see no ground for
concluding that the index [the former non-statutory list
maintained by the Department of Health] is …
disproportionate to the objective to be obtained.”
In Secretary of State for Health v C [2002] EWHC 1381
(Admin), Scott Baker J refers to the listing under the
statutory scheme as involving a difficult balancing exercise
between the safety of children and the rights of individuals
to have their livelihoods and reputations safeguarded.
THE NEW TRIBUNAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
The Care Standards Tribunal came into existence in
England and Wales from 1 April 2002. It incorporates two
existing Tribunals, the old Registered Homes Tribunal and
the newly created Protection of Children Act Tribunal. It
has been given wider powers as a result of the Care
Standards Act 2000 and the Education Act 2002.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the human
rights issues that are raised by this new jurisdiction. It is
true to say that the Act itself is a response in a sense to the
Human Rights Act 1998, in the need to ensure that
administrative decision making is compliant with the
European Convention. All Government departments
audited their procedures in the light of the implementation
and it was concluded that the procedures barring
individuals from working with children were wanting. The
creation of the Protection of Children Act Tribunal
introduces an independent tier of merits review of
administrative decisions in this field (Protection of
Children Act 1999, s9). It was felt that judicial review of
administrative action was not sufficient to comply with the
Convention provisions, in particular, Article 6. Whether
this approach was unduly cautious is of little consequence
any more. In any event, judicial pronouncements in the
analogous field of housing law suggest that compliance 23
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based on judicial review alone cannot be taken as read.
Laws LJ in Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2002] 2 All ER
668, upheld in the House of Lords [2003] 1 All ER 731,
set out a framework for analysing when administrative
schemes might or might not be compliant. At one end of
the paradigm would be those cases where a scheme’s
subject matter involved the resolution of primary fact,
whilst at the other end would be those cases where the
subject matter generally or systematically required the
application of judgment or the exercise of discretion,
especially if it involved the weighing of policy issues and
regard being had to the interests of others who were not
before the decision maker.
According to Laws LJ’s approach, in the latter situation
the court would be satisfied, for the purposes of Article 6,
with a form of inquisition at first instance in which the
decision-maker was more of an expert than a judge, and
the second instance appeal was in the nature of judicial
review. In contrast, in the former situation, involving fact
finding, a judicial review jurisdiction might not suffice.
Where within the spectrum would fall decisions taken by
the Department of Health, Department of Education and
Skills, or the now created National Care Standards
Commission, in relation to preventing individuals or
organisations from working with children, can only be
open to conjecture. There is certainly fact finding required
for all decisions in this area, and thus it is likely that Article
6 considerations would demand a full merits appeal of the
decision.
One final matter of policy requires a mention. The
jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been established to provide
a merits appeal of decisions, for example, to place
individuals on the statutory lists barring them from
working with children or to cancel registration of
proprietors of care homes. There is no merits appeal for
relatives and others who, having complained of the conduct
of particular individuals, find that the complaint does not
result in a barring decision. It could be argued that the
absence of any appeal in this situation sends an unfortunate
message to those who expect an even-handed approach to
child protection issues. The relatives faced with a rejection
of their complaints against particular individuals have no
satisfactory remedy at the present time.
THE CASE LAW OF THE TRIBUNAL
There is an important statutory difference between the
social work cases and the education cases. In the case of
social workers, there is a two fold test laid down by Statute,
namely, misconduct and unsuitability. In the education
cases, it is not necessary as such to have to prove
unsuitability to work with children. This was accepted by
the Tribunal in the education case of M v Secretary of State for
Education and Skills [2002.11.PC] where the Tribunal
decided that M had downloaded child pornography on to
his home computer, but where there was no suggestion
that he had misbehaved in any way in school. He had been
convicted by a Magistrates’ Court of a criminal offence but
the conviction had been set aside by the Crown Court. The
Tribunal of course applied a “balance of probability” test
rather than a “beyond reasonable doubt” test, and the
Tribunal had before it more evidence than the material that
had formed the basis of the criminal procedure.
Misconduct, medical reasons, or that “he is not a fit and
proper person to be employed as a teacher” will do, and it
is implied that the teacher is unsuitable if one of these
grounds is made out.
First to be considered are some of the social work cases
that have been decided by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s
powers in relation to social workers who are placed on the
list as being unsuitable to work with children is contained
in section 4(3) of the Protection of Children Act 1999 as
amended by section 99 of the Care Standards Act 2000.
The section reads as follows:
“If on an appeal or determination under this section the Tribunal
is not satisfied of either of the following, namely – (a) that
the individual was guilty of misconduct (whether or not in the
course of his duties) which harmed the child or placed the
child at risk of harm; and (b) that the individual is unsuitable
to work with children, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or
determine the issue in the individual’s favour and (in either
case) direct his removal from the list; otherwise it shall dismiss
the appeal or direct the individual’s inclusion in the list.”
The burden of proof is on the Secretary of State, the
standard of proof being the civil standard of a balance of
probability. The Tribunal has followed Lord Nichols’
approach in the child care case, Re H and ors [1996] 1 All
ER 1 where he said:
“Where the matters in issue are fact, the standard of proof
required in non-criminal proceedings is the preponderance of
probability, usually referred to as the balance of
probability…When assessing the probabilities the court have
in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the
particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less
likely it is that the event occurred, and hence, the stronger
should be the evidence before the court concludes that the
evidence is established on the balance of probability.”
Lord Hoffman said much the same in a national security
case, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman
[2002] 1 All ER 122:
“It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the
creature seen walking in Regent’s Park was more likely than
not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same
standard of probability that he was an Alsatian. On this basis,
cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal
that a person has…behaved in some…reprehensible manner.”
An interesting case that illustrates the human rights
perspective of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is Barnes v
Secretary of State for Health [0070] (and reproduced in Care
Standards Legislation Handbook, Pearl and Hershman,24
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Jordans, 2002). The facts of this case relate to events that
occurred in children’s homes managed by the former
Clwyd and Gwynedd County Councils in North Wales in
the 1970’s and 1980’s. A major police investigation had
been begun in 1991, and this resulted in a number of
residential social workers being convicted of serious sexual
and physical abuse. Other social workers, although not
prosecuted, were also named in the major report into the
abuse of children who had been placed in residential care
homes in these areas (Lost in Care : the Waterhouse Inquiry
HC 201, HMSO, 2000). One of these was Mr Barnes, and
thus on 4 January 2001, the Department wrote to Mr
Barnes informing him that his name was being included in
the statutory list barring him from working with children.
A flavour of the approach taken by the Waterhouse Inquiry
in relation to Mr Barnes is given by the following extract
from Lost in Care, para 13.56:
“…we are satisfied that Barnes was viewed by some of the
residents as a remote, unfriendly and arrogant figure and that
he was responsible for instituting, or at least maintaining,
what they saw as an oppressive and authoritarian regime…”
The Department identified nine particular instances of
misconduct. Of these nine, the Tribunal was satisfied that
he harmed a child or placed a child at risk of harm on two
of these occasions. The Tribunal then went on to consider
whether, in consequence of these two findings, Mr Barnes
was unsuitable to work with children. The Tribunal said as
follows:
“There will of course be cases where it necessarily follows that
a finding of misconduct carries with it the inevitable finding
of unsuitability. There will be other cases where a finding of
misconduct does not carry with it this consequence…It must
be said that context, in this situation, is very important
indeed. We have found proved two allegations of excessive
discipline that occurred more than twenty years ago. Mr
Barnes had responsibility, on any showing, for some very
disturbed youngsters…We have placed in the balance our
findings as to misconduct, when they happened and the
context in which they occurred, as against his career as a
social worker extending over many years…It is our view that
the Protection of Children Act 1999 obliges us to adopt a
proportionate response to our findings of misconduct. In this
case, having heard all that has been said on behalf of Mr
Barnes, and taking into account the two findings of
misconduct, we are not satisfied on a balance of probability
that Mr Barnes is unsuitable to work with children.”
The appeal was therefore allowed and the Department
was directed to remove his name from the list. In an earlier
case, Hall v Secretary of State for Health [0003], the allegations
were of a serious sexual nature and the Tribunal concluded
that the allegations, if proved, were of such seriousness that
it would be a clear indication that he is unsuitable to work
with children. In the result, in that case, the allegations
were proved, and in consequence the appeal was
dismissed.
A second case arising out of the events in North Wales is
Joan Glover v Secretary of State for Health [0077]. Mrs Glover
was found by the Inquiry, and the Tribunal, to have
physically assaulted a number of children in her care. She
admitted that “she used a slap as a last resort” across the
legs or the bottom. Once she slapped a child across the
face. On the basis of these admissions, the Tribunal had no
difficulty in making findings of misconduct that harmed a
child or placed a child at risk of harm. As to unsuitability
today, the Tribunal said:
“The Tribunal accepted that it does not follow that the
applicant remains unsuitable to work with children in 2002
simply because she was unsuitable to work with children in
1979 or 1981. However, defects of character and
temperament are not easily changed and do not usually
change unless they are specifically addressed. There was no
evidence that the applicant had taken any steps to confront or
to modify her character or temperament.”
The appeal was dismissed.
Woodcock v Secretary of State for Health [2002.4.PC] is
another case that raised issues based on allegations going
back many years, in this case between 1987 and 1992. As
in other cases, a substantial volume of written and video
evidence had by now been lost or destroyed. The
allegations against him related to inappropriate sexual
touching of young boys in his care. The Tribunal was
satisfied as to the most serious of these allegations. It went
on to say:
“Given the seriousness of the allegations which we have found
proved, we have no doubt that Mr Woodcock is unsuitable to
work with children. We reached this conclusion both because
of the seriousness of the misconduct and the fact that Mr
Woodcock has consistently denied that misconduct and has
hence no opportunity for treatment which might have led us
to a different conclusion.”
A similar approach was taken in Jackson [0061], where
Mr Jackson had been acquitted of sexual assault. The
Tribunal, applying a balance of probability test rather than
the criminal test of beyond reasonable doubt, decided that
it was more likely than not that he was guilty of the sexual
assault, and that he was in consequence unsuitable to work
with children.
Evidence in these cases is always difficult to produce,
and there are two cases that both illustrate the point. C v
Secretary of State for Health ([0037] and reported in Family
Law, July [2002]) related to allegations of rape by a foster
parent back in 1983, and certain allegations that his own
children and step-children had been mistreated by him
when they were young. The police and the Crown
Prosecution Services investigated a late complaint, but no
further action was taken. C was however placed on the list
barring him from working with children and young
persons. The Tribunal referred to the fact that in
considering C’s appeal against the decision to bar him from 25
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working with children, C was “entitled to a fair hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The allegations could not be tested by live evidence,
because the person who made the allegation was not called
to give evidence. C also did not give live evidence. The
Tribunal allowed the appeal, stating:
“Findings can only be based on evidence and we must not
speculate. That would be unfair to all those involved…The
evidence that he is guilty of misconduct is simply not there.”
The Secretary of State appealed and his appeal was
dismissed (see [2002] EWHC 1381 (Admin)). The
Administrative Court said that the Tribunal was right to
have allowed C’s appeal and there had been no error of law
on the part of the Tribunal. The court said that it would be
slow to interfere with the decision of a Tribunal
“composed of particular members selected for their
expertise.” The issues faced by the Tribunal had been issues
of fact that the Tribunal had been in the best position to
decide. The Court of Appeal, by contrast, took the view
that the Tribunal was in error not to have considered whether
to draw adverse inferences from the fact that no evidence had
been given in person by the appellant. The matter has now
been remitted to a new Tribunal: [2003] EWCA Civ 10.
A similar result to that in C, although for differing
reasons, occurred in Black v Secretary of State for Health
[0087]. Allegations were made by “A” that back in the
1980’s, whilst in residential care, he had been sexually
abused by Mr Black. The disclosure was made in 1998. As
with most of these cases, no criminal prosecution took
place. Nevertheless, Mr Black was eventually placed on the
list as a person who was unsuitable to work with children.
He appealed. The Tribunal heard a great deal of live
evidence in this case, in contrast to that in C where no live
evidence was presented. “A” was deemed to be a
“vulnerable adult” and his evidence, in accordance with the
Rules, was given by live video link. The Tribunal looked in
particular at the circumstances surrounding the disclosure
and the conflicting evidence that was presented about “A’s”
truthfulness. In the final analysis, they concluded that his
evidence was unreliable, and in consequence the appeal
was allowed.
Those are two cases where findings of fact went in favour
of the appellant. If the findings of fact go against the
appellant, the Tribunal must turn its attention to
unsuitability. Here, the Tribunal must assess risk and
inevitably a failure to undergo treatment to address the
various concerns is an important and possibly
overwhelming factor. Thus in Miles v Secretary of State for
Health [0047], yet another case concerning excessive
discipline of children in residential care a number of years
ago, the Tribunal suggested that the evidential burden was
on the applicant to show suitability:
“…the fact of the matter was that Mr Miles had not
undergone any treatment of any kind to address the issue and
without some psychiatric or medical evidence to show that Mr
Miles was no longer a risk to children, the Tribunal could not
find that Mr Miles was now suitable to work with children.”
In Swindells v Secretary of State for Health the applicant had
been in weekly therapy for three years, but there was no
information regarding the results of the therapy, and thus
the Tribunal was unable to satisfy itself that the applicant,
convicted in Germany of distributing child pornography,
no longer posed a risk of reoffending. In Woodcock, the
Tribunal referred to the fact that Mr Woodcock had
consistently denied the misconduct and “hence had no
opportunity for treatment which might have led us to a
different conclusion (on unsuitability).”
A similar approach was taken in Glover [0077] where the
Tribunal, in dealing with a lack of any supporting
statements for Mrs Glover, said:
“The burden was not upon the applicant to establish her
suitability. The legal burden remained upon the Secretary of
State to establish unsuitability. However, having been found,
in terms, to have been unsuitable to work with children in the
past, the applicant did have some obligation to adduce
positive evidence of change or difference, from professional
colleagues or supervisors. The tribunal was troubled by her
failure to do so.”
Two of the education cases are worth a brief look. In
Mason v Secretary of State for Education and Skills [0078], Mr
Mason had formed a consensual sexual relationship with a
16 year former pupil. The relationship began during the
summer holidays after the pupil had left the school. In the
autumn, with the relationship still continuing, she went to
a senior school that shared the same site and had the same
headmaster. The Tribunal decided that his name should
remain on the list and his employment restricted, and said:
“We have no doubt that Mr Mason now realises that he made
a serious error of judgment in his relationship with pupil X.
However, we are not convinced that Mr Mason has yet
developed the maturity to understand fully why boundaries
should be set and how and where to obtain appropriate advice
should difficulties occur.”
The education area is different from the social work field
in that a teacher can be placed on the list for medical
reasons. The Guidance refers to medical conditions such as
drug or alcohol abuse or mental illness that significantly
impairs his or her abilities to discharge their
responsibilities as a teacher (see Preventing unsuitable people
from working with children and young persons). The first case
where an appeal has been heard after a person has been
placed on the list for medical reasons is MacBride v Secretary
of State for Education and Skills [0080] where the medical
evidence suggested chronic anxiety symptoms, both
generalised and specific. The Tribunal formed the view on
the basis of the evidence before it that the medical
condition of this teacher was such that the welfare of
children being taught by her was likely to be at risk. It
therefore dismissed the appeal.26
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CONCLUSIONS
The Care Standards Act 2000 is a wide ranging statute.
It establishes a new independent regulatory body for social
care and private and voluntary health care in England, the
National Care Standards Commission. In Wales, these
services are now under the control of the National
Assembly for Wales. An independent Council has also been
established to register social workers and to set standards
in social work. An independent Children’s Commissioner
has been established in Wales, and it may well be that a
similar scheme will be introduced in time in England as
well. Childminders and day care providers are now also
regulated. There is an expanded statutory list of those
unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults. Appeals in these
areas are brought before the Care Standards Tribunal.
It is likely, in the light of ongoing reforms of the
administrative justice system in England and Wales, that
the specialist education and health Tribunals will draw
closer together. These early decisions will provide a
framework for the developments in the future, maintaining
the central policy that the safety and welfare of our
children must be protected, whilst at the same time
ensuring that an individual’s human rights are not ignored
whenever decisions are taken to prohibit people from
working with children and young people. The early history
of the Care Standards Tribunal makes clear that decisions
of Government Ministers are not simply “rubber
stamped”. Although the decisions of the Tribunal are of
course individual decisions on particular facts, the
indications are that it has begun to lay down guidance that
will help in the formulation of standards in this sensitive
area of social policy.
All Care Standards Tribunal decisions are available on
the Tribunal website, www.carestandardstribunal.gov.uk
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My focus is principally, although not exclusively, onthe constitutions of states which are in theprocess of transformation, as the constitutional
courts in these countries appear more open to newer
approaches and ideas. This is an openness from which we
in the more established democracies may have much to learn.
REASONS FOR DEVELOPING A
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
The cultural identity of a compassionate, democratic
society is in part assessed by how accessible lawyers and
Constitutions are to the most vulnerable in our community.
Because of the limited direct access to international human
rights fora, constitutional rights of children are particularly
important because a supreme or constitutional court may
offer the highest form of remedy. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, unlike the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, still does not have a mechanism through which
children may have their complaints against a state
adjudicated. An attempt was made during the drafting of
the Convention by Amnesty International but this did not
The constitutional rights
of children
by Geraldine Van Bueren
The significant difference between modernity and past eras is that
modernity emphasises choice and autonomy and the past relied upon fate.
This is an enquiry both into the effectiveness of constitutions in seeking to
protect the autonomous rights of children and whether a global culture of
children’s constitutional rights is beginning to develop. Children’s civil and
political constitutional rights are analysed as well as their economic, social
and cultural constitutional rights, as it is the poorest children, who many
unthinkingly dismiss as being beyond the scope of justiciability and the courts.
